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1 Introduction
The capital structure choice is one of the most important decisions made by corporate nancial
managers. Modigliani and Miller (1963) show that, under certain assumptions, the value of the
rm increases with debt in an amount equal to the present value of the interest tax shields.
However, from an applied perspective, the question of how important debt tax shields are in
practice is still under great debate. We use a dynamic model of the rm to investigate the
proportion of rm value that is explained by the tax advantage of debt as well as the determinants
of the tax benet.
In an inuential paper, Graham (2000) nds that the mean value of the interest tax shields
equals approximately 10% of the value of the rm.1 However, in subsequent work, Blouin,
Core, and Guay (2010) argue that Grahams value might be overestimated due to his underlying
random walk assumption for earnings, as opposed to the usual mean-reverting process.2 Thus,
by substituting the former with the latter in the dynamic model, we are able to quantify the
overestimation generated by the random walk restriction. Under a standard parameterization in
the corporate nance literature, we nd that, in our model, the debt tax shields represent only
about 3% of rm value, which is in line with the conjecture of Blouin, Core, and Guay.
Consistently with the ndings of Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Stre-
bulaev (2010) regarding observed leverage ratios, we also nd that the value of the tax benets
of debt as a fraction of rm value is countercyclical over the economic cycle.
In addition, we do a cross-sectional comparison of the interest tax shields from rms in
di¤erent industries (e.g., Oil and Gas Extraction, Chemicals, and Printing and Publishing), and
nd that the tax benets of debt vary substantially across them, which agrees with the evidence
reported by Cordes and She¤rin (1983). This variability arises as these rms choose considerably
di¤erent levels of optimal debt due to their dissimilar fundamental characteristics. In order to
shed further light on this nding, we study the importance of the di¤erent primitive features of
1 In related papers, van Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010) and Korteweg (2010) report that the net benets
of debt account for 3.5% and 5.5% of rm value, respectively.
2A large body of accounting literature on earnings suggests that they are mean-reverting (see, e.g., Hayn (1995)
and references therein).
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the rm through a comparative statics analysis of the fraction of the stock price explained by
the interest tax shields. Jointly with the interest rate on debt and the income tax rate, we nd
that the curvature of the production function is a fundamental determinant of the tax benets
of debt. This novel result is signicant because, while this primitive rm characteristic has been
studied substantially by the industrial organization literature in economics, it has received little
attention in nance as a determinant of corporate borrowing.3
By highlighting the importance of the curvature of the production function, our work com-
plements the extensive nance literature studying the determinants of the interest tax shields
and leverage. For instance, in line with our results, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) nd that the
non-debt tax deductions (e.g., the operating costs and capital depreciation) are important deter-
minants of the tax benets of debt. Furthermore, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) and Long and
Malitz (1985) also show that the benets of debt are strongly related to the volatility of earnings
and growth opportunities, while Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Rajan
and Zingales (1995) nd a negative association between protability and leverage.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive the analytic solution of the dynamic
model of the rm and dene the interest tax shields. In Section 3, we study the economic
importance of the tax advantage of debt. The comparative statics analysis of the proportion of
the stock price explained by the tax benets of leverage is in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Appendix 1 provides two robustness checks; it shows our results remain valid even if we allow for
risky debt and costly external nance. Appendix 2 describes the calibration of model parameters.
2 A Dynamic Model of the Firm
This section solves the dynamic model of the rm in closed-form and denes the value of the
interest tax shields.
In every period (e.g., quarter, year, etc.), the rm chooses capital and debt in order to
3See, e.g., Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007), and the references therein.
4The list of important papers in this literature is vast, including, but not limited to, Harris and Raviv (1991),
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Graham and Harvey (2001), Fama and
French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), and Frank and Goyal (2009).
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maximize its current stock price. We write a tilde on variable X (i.e., eX) to indicate that it is
growing over time. The book value of assets in period t is denoted by variable eKt and depreciates
at rate  2 [0; 1] in each period. The rm uses debt eDt in period t, which we assume expires in one
period. Without any loss of generality, we let the market cost of debt rB be equal to the coupon
rate cB, which makes the market value of debt eBt equal the book value of debt eDt. We initially
follow DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) and assume the rm issues risk-free debt. This
feature allows us to both capture the apparent conservatism in debt usage reported by Graham
(2000) and obtain a closed-form solution for our model, which improves the description of the
results.5 In this context, the market cost of debt, rB, equals the risk-free interest rate, rf , in the
economy. Then, in Appendix 1, we show that our ndings do not change when we consider risky
debt.
The prot shock, zt, is a random variable that follows a logarithmic AR(1) process
ln (zt) = ln (c) +  ln (zt 1) + "t (1)
where c > 0 is a constant and parameter  2 (0; 1) denes the degree of mean-reversion of prots.
Finally, we assume "t is an iid normal random term with mean 0 and variance 2.
The rm obtains net prots in period t according to the following function
eNt = h(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rB eBti (1  ) (2)
where (1 + g)t(1 ) represents the level of technology in period t and allows the rm to grow at
rate g  0. Parameter  2 (0; 1) denotes the curvature of the production function with respect
to capital, f > 0 indicates the operating costs, and parameter  2 [0; 1) represents the income
tax rate.6 Then, the dividend that shareholders receive from the rm in period t is
eLt = eNt   h eKt+1   eKt   eBt+1   eBti : (3)
The market cost of equity is denoted by rS , the market cost of capital is indicated by rA, and we
impose the restriction that the market cost of capital exceeds the growth rate (i.e., rA > g) to
guarantee the existence of share price.
5Lazzati and Menichini (2014a) show that these assumptions about debt produce leverage predictions that are
in line with several important ndings reported by the literature on capital structure.
6We also assume (f + ) (1  )  1 to guarantee that the stock price is weakly positive.
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, in order to maximize the stock price. Accordingly, the market value of
equity is given by








subject to the restriction of risk-free debt and where E0 denotes the expectation over future prot
shocks given current information (i.e., eK0; eB0; z0). We say debt is risk-free if, at the end of each
period, net prots plus assets, eNt + eKt, are su¢ cient to pay o¤ the debt, eBt. Leland (1994) uses
a similar type of debt covenant. We extend this model in Appendix 1 to include risky debt as
well as costly external nance.
We solve Equation (4) in closed-form and nd the following expression for the stock price
eSt  eKt; eBt; zt = h(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rB eBti (1  ) + eKt   eBt + eGt (zt) (5)
where the going-concern value is eGt (zt) = fMt (zt)P . Variable fMt (zt) is given by
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Equation (5) exhibits the stock price, which represents an analytic solution of the Gordon
Growth Model in the dynamic and stochastic setting.7
7Lazzati and Menichini (2014b) include the proof of Equation (5) and describe each of its parts in detail.
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The tax advantage of debt is dened as the present value of the reduction in current and
future corporate income tax bills due to interest payments on debt. Given our previous results,
the value of the interest tax shields takes the following form.
The Value of the Interest Tax Shields






The rst term in equation (10) denotes the interest tax shield from the interest payment on
current-period debt. The second term indicates the present value of the interest tax shields stem-
ming from the expected future interest payments. The expression in square brackets represents
the discounted value of the future stream of optimal debt decisions. From equations (6) through
(9), we can observe that the second term in equation (10) depends explicitly on all the primitive
characteristics of the rm (i.e., the elasticity of capital, the capital depreciation rate, etc.) In par-
ticular, it depends on the kind of process followed by rm prots, which is dened by parameter
. In our baseline analysis, we let prots follow a mean-reverting process (i.e., 0 <  < 1). We
then show that if we assume instead a random walk process, results change substantially. This
nding sheds light on the current debate regarding the actual value of the tax advantage of debt,
as we discuss below.
3 The Value of the Interest Tax Shields
In Subsection 3.1, we ascertain the economic importance of the interest tax shields as a component
of the stock price, and investigate some of their relevant time-series properties. We then study
the signicance of the tax benets of debt for di¤erent SIC industries in Subsection 3.2.
3.1 Analysis of a Representative Firm
We start parameterizing the model for a representative rm. The parameterization follows Lazzati
and Menichini (2014b) and is standard in the corporate nance literature (see, e.g., Hennessy and
Whited (2007) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011)). The elasticity of capital () is set
at 0.65, the volatility of the innovations () equals 0.20, and the persistence of prot shocks ()
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is 0.75. We set operating costs (f) and the capital depreciation rate () equal to 0.20 and 0.10,
respectively. Furthermore, we use standard values for the corporate income tax rate,  = 0:35,
the market cost of debt, rB = 0:02, the market cost of capital, rA = 0:08, and the long-run growth
rate, g = 0:01. Finally, we set parameter c equal to 1 because we are studying a representative
rm. The parameter values we just described refer to a period of a year.
For simplicity, we assume that the rm is at the beginning of its life (i.e., t = 0) and the
current state







(1 2) , eK0 = c 11  e 122 1(1 2) 11  W , and eB0 = ` eK0: (11)
Using the previous parameter values, we obtain z0 = 1:05, eK0 = 3:89, and eB0 = 3:09.
Table 1 exhibits our main results. In the base case parameterization, the interest tax
shields represent 3.47% of the stock price and 2.73% of rm value. This value of the
tax benets of debt is lower than the 10% suggested by Graham (2000). As we explained before,
a di¤erence between his work and ours is the distinct assumption made about the evolution of
prots over the business cycle. We assume that income follows a mean-reverting process while
Graham assumes it follows a random walk. Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) argue that the
latter overestimates the benets from interest tax deductions as a consequence of the random
walk restriction. Our model conrms this prediction and allows us to quantify the degree of
overvaluation.
[Insert Table 1 here]
In order to connect our results more closely with those of Graham (2000), we explore the
e¤ect of changing parameter  on the fraction of rm value explained by the tax benets of debt,eTt  eBt; zt = h eBt + eSt  eKt; eBt; zti. In Section 2, we described that parameter  denes the type
of process followed by rm prots. In our model, the restriction 0 <  < 1 makes them mean-
reverting. However, as we increase  and make it closer to 1, the behavior of prots approximates
a random walk. Accordingly, Panel A in Figure 1 shows the fraction of rm value explained
by the tax advantage of debt as we increase  (while we keep rm value constant)8. It is clear
8Graham (2000) computes the interest tax shields assuming prots follow a random walk, and divides them by
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that, as  approximates 1, that proportion increases steadily and exceeds 10%, suggesting that a
random walk assumption for rm prots would overestimate the tax benets of debt.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We close this subsection describing some interesting time-series properties of the interest tax
shields. Panel B in Figure 1 displays the stochastic evolution over time of the proportion of
the value of the rm explained by the tax benets of debt as well as the prot shock, zt. We
simulate the model over 100 periods with the base case parameterization described above. We
can observe that the proportion of rm value explained by the interest tax shields (solid line)
is negatively related to the prot shocks (dashed line). This phenomenon implies that the
fraction of rm value explained by the interest tax shields is countercyclical over
the business cycle. That is, when prot shocks are high, the proportion of rm
value explained by this component falls and vice versa. This pattern occurs because
market equity is more sensitive to prot shocks than are the interest tax shields, and suggests
that the economic importance of the latter increases during economic recessions as opposed to
expansions. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) report
evidence suggesting that observed leverage ratios move countercyclically, which is consistent with
our results.
3.2 Cross-Industry Analysis
In the previous subsection, we analyzed the value of the interest tax shields for a representative
rm. We now extend those results to compare the importance of the tax advantage of debt for
rms in di¤erent SIC industries. We consider the following industries: Oil and Gas Extraction
(OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing (PP). These rms di¤er from each other
with respect to all of the fundamental characteristics, specially the curvature of the production
function and the non-debt tax deductions. These di¤erences make those rms select considerably
dissimilar optimal debt ratios and, as consequence, they exhibit quite di¤erent levels of interest
the market value of the rm (which we suppose is determined by the market assuming mean-reverting prots). For
that reason, we vary the interest tax shields while we keep rm value constant.
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tax shields. We use Compustat data to parameterize the model for each industry and show their
values in Panel A of Table 2. Appendix 2 describes the procedure used to obtain those parameters
for each industry.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of the cross-sectional comparison. The low non-debt
tax deductions (i.e., operating costs, f , plus depreciation, ) in the OGE industry make those
rms have high book leverage ratio (` = 0:76) while the opposite is true for rms in the C
industry (` = 0:36). Optimal leverage for rms in the PP industry is between these two extreme
values (` = 0:69). Accordingly, the fraction of rm value explained by the tax advantage of debt
is 2.07% for OGE rms, 1.38% for PP rms, and just 0.34% for C rms. As we show in the
following section, the fact that OGE rms have higher elasticity of capital () than the other two
industries also contributes to the larger proportion of interest tax shields.
In summary, there is substantial variation in the value of the tax advantage of debt
across industries. We nd that this variability stems from the fact that these industries di¤er
in all their primitive features, specially the elasticity of capital and the non-debt tax deductions
which, as we describe in the next section, are among the most important determinants of the tax
benets of debt. This result is in line with the evidence reported by Cordes and She¤rin (1983).
4 The Determinants of the Interest Tax Shields
In order to study the determinants of the interest tax shields, we perform a sensitivity analysis
that allows us to ascertain how the fraction of the stock price explained by the tax advantage of
debt, eT0  eB0; z0 =eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, varies when we change the primitive rm characteristics. In
addition to understanding the directional impact of those fundamental features, we identify the
ones with the largest inuence on the interest tax shields. We do this study using the base case
parameterization described in Subsection 3.1 and changing those values by up to  20%.
Table 3 presents the results of this comparative statics analysis. The table shows clearly
that the curvature of the production function () is the main determinant of that
proportion. For example, for the base case parameter value of  = 0:65, the interest tax shields
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represent 3.47% of the stock price, percentage that goes up to 6.74% when  increases to 0.78.
It turns out that the interest tax shields, eT0  eB0; z0, are considerably more sensitive to  than
is the stock price, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, producing the result just described.
As expected, the income tax rate () and the market cost of debt (rB) are also
important parameters. A 20% increment in  from 0.35 to 0.42 increases the proportion of
interest tax shields from 3.47% to 4.56%, while a similar proportional increment in rB (i.e., from
0.02 to 0.024) augments the fraction of the tax advantage of debt from 3.47% to 4.11%. Finally,
the joint e¤ect of the non-debt tax deductions (f + ) also plays a signicant role.
The other parameters a¤ect this fraction to a lesser extent.
[Insert Table 3 here]
5 Conclusion
We use a dynamic model of the rm to investigate both the economic importance of the interest
tax shields and their main determinants. Assuming a random walk process for prots, Gra-
ham (2000) nds that the value of the tax benet of leverage is around 10% of rm value. By
substituting that assumption with a mean-reverting process, we nd that the tax advantage of
debt represents about 3% of the value of the rm. Our results are consistent with Blouin, Core,
and Guay (2010), who suggest that the random walk assumption for earnings overestimates the
value of the interest tax shields. In addition, we nd that the value of the debt tax shields is
countercyclical over the business cycle.
Regarding the underlying factors, we nd that the curvature of the production function is
among the main determinants of the proportion of rm value explained by the interest tax
shields. This new result is signicant because it highlights an aspect of the problem that so far
has not received great attention from the corporate nance literature. As expected, we also nd
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6 Appendix 1: Robustness Checks
6.1 Risky Debt
In this subsection, we extend the model presented in Section 2 to include the possibility of the
rm to issue risky debt. This robustness check is necessary since the risk-free debt assumption
might undervalue the tax benets of debt. As we show next, our results regarding the economic
importance of the interest tax shields remain the same in this more general setting.
The risky debt model only di¤ers from the risk-free debt one in that it includes bankruptcy
costs and a bankruptcy triggering event (i.e., all the other features of the rm are the same). We
follow Hennessy and Whited (2007) and assume the bankruptcy costs in period t are given by
 eKt, where parameter  > 0 represents the proportion of assets that is lost in bankruptcy. In
this model, the event of bankruptcy happens whenever
zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rBt` eKt (1  ) + eKt   ` eKt < 0: (12)
That is, bankruptcy is triggered when the prot shock, zt, is such that the sum of net prots,
zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rBt` eKt (1  ), and the value of assets, eKt, is insu¢ cient to cover current
debt, ` eKt. In this case, we assume the rm pays the bankruptcy costs and shuts down.
Another important feature of the risky debt model is that the interest rate charged by debt-





(1  t+1) eDt+1  1 + rBt+1+ t+1 eRt+1jzti (13)
where the indicator function t equals 1 if the rm goes into bankruptcy in period t, and 0
otherwise. Variable eRt+1 is the amount of money received by the debt claimants in the case of
bankruptcy. Specically, eRt = minn eDt; eKt + eNt   t eKto (14)
which suggests that creditors receive the minimum between the nominal value of the debt and the
value of the assets in bankruptcy. Equation (13) means that debt claimants require an interest
rate that equates the nominal value of the debt to the expected discounted payo¤ of debt in the
next period.9
9Similar to Moyen (2004) and Hennessy and Whited (2007), we assume that bond-holders are risk-neutral.
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With the previous assumptions, the stock price is nally given by








where eLt = eNt   h eKt+1   eKt   eBt+1   eBti   t eKt. Unfortunately, the expression above
does not have an analytic solution, so we proceed to solve it numerically by backward induction.
We calibrate all previous model parameters as we explained in Subsection 3.1. Following
Andrade and Kaplan (1998), we calibrate the new parameter  such that it represents 20% of
rm value. We then reproduce the information in Table 1 using the risky-debt model and show
the results in Panel A of Table 4. We nd that the interest tax shields represent 4.15%
of the stock price and 3.27% of rm value. These results imply that the possibility of the
rm to issue risky debt does not a¤ect our main conclusions. That is, the assumption about the
stochastic process followed by income (i.e., mean-reversion vs. random walk) plays a fundamental
role in the valuation of the benets from interest tax deductions, with the random walk assumption
producing an overvaluation of those benets. Overall, we nd that the predictions of the
risky debt model conrm those of the risk-free debt model.
[Insert Table 4 here]
6.2 Costly External Finance
In Subsection 3.1, we investigated the value of the interest tax shields in a context of no
issuance costs of debt or equity. In this subsection, we study the e¤ects of adding those costs. In
order to do this analysis, we extend the risky debt model described in the previous subsection by
adding a cost function of external nance.
Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) suggest that the costs of issuance are convex, both for debt and
equity. Accordingly, we use the following linear-quadratic cost function of external nance
eCt = d
264d1  eBt+1   eBt+ d2
 eBt+1   eBt2eBt
375+ e
264e1 eXt+1 + e2
 eXt+12eKt   eBt
375 (16)
where eXt+1 =  eKt+1   eKt   eBt+1   eBt  eNt represents the equity issuance in period t. The
indicator function d equals 1 if eBt+1  eBt > 0, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, the indicator function
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e equals 1 if eXt+1 > 0, and 0 otherwise. This feature implies that issuing debt and/or equity is
costly, while reducing them is not. Parameters d1 and 
d
2 denote the linear and quadratic costs
of issuing debt, respectively, while parameters e1 and 
e
2 reect the analogous costs for equity.
Finally, we assume that the costs of external nance are tax deductible.
We proceed to calibrate the parameters in equation (16) following the evidence reported by
Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) and Hennessy and Whited (2007). Accordingly, we let d1 = 0:01,
d2 = 0:0002, 
e
1 = 0:1, and 
e
2 = 0:0004, which reect the empirical observation that issuing
equity is more expensive than issuing debt. All other model parameters are calibrated as before.
We then repeat the analysis in Table 1 and present our ndings in Panel B of Table 4. The
fraction of share price and rm value explained by the interest tax shields is 4.04%
and 3.19%, respectively. These results are similar, though slightly lower, than those of the
previous subsection and suggest that costly external nance does not play an important role
regarding the value of the benets from interest tax deductions.
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7 Appendix 2: Calibration of Model Parameters
We need to nd parameter values for c; ; ; ; f; ;  ; rB; rA; and g for each of the three industries.
We calibrate the model using Compustat annual data for all rms in each of the three SIC codes
(i.e., Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE) is SIC 13, Printing, Publishing, and Allied Products (PP) is
SIC 27, and Chemicals and Allied Products (C) is SIC 28). The sample covers the period 1990-
2013 and includes 9,476 rm-years for the OGE industry, 1,859 rm-years for the PP industry,
and 11,162 rm-years for the C industry.
In order to obtain parameter f , we average the ratio Selling, General, and Administrative
Expense (XSGA)/Assets - Total (AT) for all rm-years in each industry. We follow the same
procedure to get  as the ratio of Depreciation and Amortization (DP) over Assets - Total (AT),
and  as the fraction Income Taxes - Total (TXT)/Pretax Income (PI). We trim these ratios
at the lower and upper one-percentiles to reduce the e¤ect of outliers and errors in the data.
Following Moyen (2004), we obtain parameters ; ; and  for each industry using the rms
autoregressive prot shock process of equation (1) and the gross prots function in equation (2),
(1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt . The data we use with these equations are Gross Prot (GP) and Assets - Total
(AT). Given that we are working with representative rms, we set c = 1 for the three industries.
We keep the assumption that the risk-free interest rate (rf = rB) is 0.02. We derive rA using
CAPM with the corresponding (unlevered) industry betas estimated by Fama and French (1997)
and assuming an expected market return (rM ) of 0.08. Finally, we obtain g for each industry




Figure 1. Interest Tax Shields as a Fraction of Firm Value. Panel A: The gure exhibits
the fraction of rm value explained by the tax benets of debt (solid line) for di¤erent values of parameter
. Panel B: The gure exhibits the evolution over time of the proportion of rm value explained by the
interest tax shields (solid line, right Y-axis) as well as the prot shocks (dashed line, left Y-axis). The
model is simulated over 100 periods with the parameterization described in Subsection 3.1.
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Table 1
Value of Market Equity and Interest Tax Shields
The table exhibits the base case results for the dynamic dividend discount model. The variables are the
market value of equity, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0; the market value of the rm, eB0 + eS0  eK0; eB0; z0; and the
interest tax shields, eT0  eB0; z0.
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Table 2
Cross-Sectional Value of Market Equity and Interest Tax Shields
Panel A: The table presents the values used to parameterize the dynamic dividend discount model for
three di¤erent SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing
(PP). Panel B: The table exhibits the results of the dynamic dividend discount model for the three SIC





Comparative Statics Analysis of Interest Tax Shields as a Fraction of
Share Price
The table shows the proportion of share price, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0, that is explained by the value of the
interest tax shields, eT0  eB0; z0, for di¤erent values of model parameters. The column labeled Base
Case contains the base case parameter values described in Subsection 3.1 while the other columns contain
proportional changes of those initial values. The parameters are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of
prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the innovation term (), the concavity of the production
function (), the operating costs (f), the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (),
the market cost of debt (rB), the market cost of capital (rA), and the growth rate (g).
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Table 4
Value of Market Equity and Interest Tax Shields:
Risky Debt and Costly Issuance of Debt and Equity
Panel A: The table exhibits the base case results for the dynamic dividend discount model with risky debt.
Panel B: The table presents the base case results for the dynamic dividend discount model with both risky
debt and costly issuance of debt and equity. The variables are the market value of equity, eS0  eK0; eB0; z0;
the market value of the rm, eB0 + eS0  eK0; eB0; z0; and the interest tax shields, eT0  eB0; z0.
Panel A
Panel B
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